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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Idaho Supreme Court Case Nos. 38316 and 38317 have been consolidated for
purposes of appeal.

In Idaho Supreme Court Case No. 38316 (hereinafter, 38316),

Edward Hochrein pleaded guilty to misdemeanor domestic battery and misdemeanor
cruelty to an animal, and was placed on probation. 1 While on probation, Mr. Hochrein
was alleged to have violated a criminal no contact order that was entered in favor of
Tanya Lewis.

The State charged Mr. Hochrein in Idaho Criminal Case No. 38317

(hereinafter, 38317) with felony violation of a no contact order based upon the allegation

that Mr. Hochrein had twice been convicted of prior violations of no contact orders in the
past.
In 38317, Mr. Hochrein was convicted of felony violation of a no contact order,
along with a persistent violator sentencing enhancement, following a jury trial. He was
sentenced to 10 years, with three years fixed, for this conviction and his misdemeanor
probation was revoked in 38316.
Mr. Hochrein timely appeals from his judgment of conviction and sentence in
38317 and from the district court's order revoking his misdemeanor probation in 38316.
On appeal, he asserts that the State presented insufficient evidence in 38317 to
establish that Mr. Hochrein had prior notice of the underlying criminal no contact order,
which is an essential element of the offense of violation of a no-contact order under
I.C. § 18-920. Further, because the jury was never instructed as to this element of the

1 Because Mr. Hochrein has now served his entire sentences in his underlying
misdemeanor probation revocation proceedings in 38316, he raises no challenge herein
to the district court's disposition on these proceedings, as any issue has since been
rendered moot. See, e.g., State v. Barclay, 149 Idaho 6,8 (2010).
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State's burden of proof, Mr. Hochrein asserts that the to-convict instruction in his case
was fatally deficient and requires reversal. Additionally, Mr. Hochrein asserts that the
district court erred when the district court determined that Ms. Lewis' prior conviction for
felony possession of a financial transaction card - for which she was granted probation
as a withheld judgment but for which her plea had yet to be withdrawn - could not be
used to impeach her testimony at trial under !.R.E. 609.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Edward Hochrein was charged with felony violation of a no-contact order based
upon the State's allegation that he had contact with Tanya Lewis in violation of a prior
no-contact order, along with the allegation that Mr. Hochrein had two prior convictions of
violating a no-contact order.

(R., pp.33-34.)

The State subsequently amended its

Information to also allege that Mr. Hochrein was eligible for a sentencing enhancement
as a persistent violator. (R., pp.1 01-1 03.)
Prior to trial, the State filed a motion in limine with the district court seeking to
preclude Mr. Hochrein from being able to introduce the prior convictions of two of its
witnesses as impeachment at trial.

(R., pp.89-90.)

The witnesses at issue were

Ms. Lewis, who had a prior felony conviction for possession of a financial transaction
card, and her boyfriend at the time of the charged offense, Christopher Yeats.
(R., pp.89-90.)

The district court held two hearings on the State's motion in limine seeking to
preclude Mr. Hochrein from being able to impeach the State's witnesses on their prior
felony convictions. At the first hearing, the State asserted that neither the prior felony
conviction of Ms. Lewis or Mr. Yeats should be admissible under I.R.E. 609. (5/13/10
Tr., p.10, L.22 - p.12, LA.) The State asserted that Ms. Lewis' conviction for felony
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possession of a financial transaction card could not be deemed a prior conviction since
she had received a withheld judgment for this offense. (5/13/10 Tr., p.11, Ls.3-11.) As
a secondary argument, the State asserted that her criminal conviction was not relevant
to the issue of credibility. (5/13/10 Tr., p.11, Ls.12-24.) Regarding Mr. Yeats' conviction
for possession of a controlled substance, the State asserted that he was an active
participant in the drug court program and therefore had not had a formal judgment of
conviction entered in his criminal case. On this basis the State also asserted that his
felony conviction should not be admissible under !.R.E. 609. (5/13/10 Tr., p.11, L.20 p.12,LA.)
Mr. Hochrein conceded that he could not impeach Mr. Lewis on his "conviction,"
since Mr. Lewis was participating in the drug court program and therefore had no
judgment of conviction entered. (5/13/10 Tr., p.12, Ls.6-10.) However, he disputed the
State's assertion that the Ms. Lewis' conviction for felony possession of a financial
transaction card should not come in for impeachment purposes under I.R.E. 609.
Mr. Hochrein noted that, as part of her underlying offense, Ms. Lewis had actually
pleaded guilty to this charge, and therefore she had a conviction for that offense for
purposes of the evidentiary rules. (5/13/10 Tr., p.12, Ls.11-19.) He further noted that,
as of the time of the motion in limine hearing, Ms. Lewis was still on probation and had
not yet been granted the ultimate relief of being able to withdraw her plea. (5/13/10
Tr., p.12, Ls.11-19.)
Additionally, Mr. Hochrein argued that this conviction was relevant to the
underlying issue of Ms. Lewis' credibility. He argued that the nature of the offense had
clear bearing on issues of credibility and truthfulness. (5/13/10 Tr., p.12, L.20 - p.13,
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L.16.) Following the arguments of the parties, the district court took the issue under
advisement. (5/13/10 Tr., p.13, L.23 - p.14, L.9.)
The court revisited the issue of the admissibility of Ms. Lewis' prior conviction
under /'R.E. 609 one week later. The district court granted the State's motion in limine
seeking to exclude this evidence. (5/20/10 Tr., p.15, L.17 - p.16, L.3.) The basis for
the court's ruling was that Ms. Lewis was granted a withheld judgment, and this was not
a conviction for purposes of /'R.E. 609. (5/20/10 Tr., p.15, L.17 - p.16, L.3.)
During Mr. Hochrein's trial on the charge of felony violation of a no-contact order,
the parties entered into stipulation that a no contact order had been entered against
Mr. Hochrein that prohibited him from being at Ms. Lewis' residence. (Trial Tr., p.142,
Ls.1-9, p.223, L.8 - p.224, L.18.)

The State presented three witnesses at trial -

Ms. Lewis, Mr. Yeats, and Officer Chris Reese of the Lewiston Police Department.
Ms. Lewis testified that she was familiar with Mr. Hochrein because they were
previously involved in a romantic relationship for about two years.
Ls.12-19.)

(Trial Tr., p.143,

After they broke up, Ms. Lewis obtained a no contact order against

Mr. Hochrein. (Trial Tr., p.144, Ls.3-9.)
Following the entry of the no contact order, on Ms. Lewis' birthday, she testified
that someone rang her doorbell while she and Mr. Yeats - her new boyfriend - were at
home.

(Trial Tr., p.144, L.11 - p.146, L.10.)

Ms. Lewis testified that she believed

Mr. Hochrein was aware of the date of her birthday since they had celebrated it together
once in the past.

(Trial Tr., p.145, Ls.4-18.) According to her testimony, Ms. Lewis

asked her boyfriend to see who was at the door. (Trial Tr., p.146, Ls.10-11.) He then
told her, after looking through the peephole, that Mr. Hochrein was standing at the door
and told Ms. Lewis to call the police. (Trial Tr., p.146, Ls.11-14.) Ms. Lewis testified
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that Mr. Yeats had only looked through the peephole on her door for about ten seconds.
(Trial Tr., p.146, L.25 - p.147, L.6.) She never personally saw Mr. Hochrein standing
outside her door that day, and - to her knowledge - Mr. Hochrein and Mr. Yeats had
never met. (Trial Tr., p.14S, Ls.S-14, p.152, Ls.14-19.)
Mr. Yeats testified next for the State. As with Ms. Lewis' testimony, Mr. Yeats
informed the jurors that he had been at Ms. Lewis' house on the day of the alleged
violation of the no contact order. (Trial Tr., p.162, Ls.14-1S.) He also testified that the
doorbell rang that afternoon, and that he got up to check and see who was at the door.
(Trial Tr., p.162, Ls.19-23.) There was some confusion in Mr. Yeats' testimony as to
how long he looked through the peephole in the door to see who was at Ms. Lewis'
home. At one point, Mr. Yeats indicated that he had looked through the peephole for
about 30 seconds. (Trial Tr., p.163, Ls.14-16.) But during cross-examination, Mr. Yeats
testified that he had only looked through the peephole for about 12-13 seconds - ten
seconds initially, and then another few seconds after telling Ms. Lewis who he thought
was at the door. (Trial Tr., p.170, Ls.11-15.) Additionally, he only saw the person at the
door during this brief time period from an angle. (Trial Tr., p.170, Ls.19-22.)
According to Mr. Yeats, the person standing at the door was wearing large
sunglasses, a baseball cap, and had facial hair. (Trial Tr., p.163, Ls.5-S, p.171, LsA-6.)
He testified that he told Ms. Lewis that he believed the man at the door was
Mr. Hochrein, and identified Mr. Hochrein as the man at the door at trial.

(Trial

Tr., p.163, L.23 - p.164, L.13.) After Ms. Lewis called the police, Mr. Yeats checked the
front door again and no one was there. (Trial Tr., p.165, Ls.3-15.) Mr. Yeats had no
idea where the person at the front door went. (Trial Tr., p.165, Ls.16-18.)
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When police arrived, Mr. Yeats testified that he spoke to an officer who produced
a photo line-up to see if he could identify the person who was at the door.

(Trial

Tr., p.166, Ls.2-7.) He further testified that he was able to identify Mr. Hochrein during
this photographic line-up. (Trial Tr., p.166, Ls.8-12.) All of the photographs in the lineup that Mr. Yeats was shown were of darker complexion than Mr. Hochrein.

(Trial

Tr., p.176, Ls.4-10.) Mr. Yeats had previously been shown photographs of Mr. Hochrein
by Ms. Lewis a couple of months prior, but he had never met him in person.

(Trial

Tr., p.166, Ls.13-18, p.178, Ls.3-9.)
The State's final witness, Officer Reese, testified that he spoke to both Ms. Lewis
and Mr. Yeats when he arrived at Ms. Lewis' home. (Trial Tr., p.191, Ls.18-23.) But he
spoke mainly with Mr. Yeats since he was the only person who claimed to see
Mr. Hochrein at Ms. Lewis' home. (Trial Tr., p.192, Ls.13-16.) He then put together a
photographic line-up.

(Trial Tr., p.192, Ls. 17-24.) Mr. Yeats immediately identified

Mr. Hochrein as the person who rang the doorbell as soon as the officer showed him
Mr. Hochrein's photograph, according to the officer's testimony. (Trial Tr., p.197, L.25p.198, L.11.)
Following Officer Reese's testimony, the district court held a jury instruction
conference with Mr. Hochrein and the State.

(Trial Tr., p.218, L.16 - p.222, L.6.)

However, there was no transcript made, nor any available record, of what transpired
during this conference. (Trial Tr., p.222, Ls.2-7.) At the start of the next day of trial, the
district court read to the jurors a factual stipulation entered into by the parties regarding
the underlying no-contact order in this case. (Trial Tr., p.222, L.9 - p.224, L.18.) There
was nothing in this factual stipulation that indicated that Mr. Hochrein had any prior
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notice of the no-contact order that he was alleged to have violated. (Trial Tr., p.224,
Ls.6-18.)
Mr. Hochrein presented the testimony of three alibi witnesses in his defense.
The first witness was Isaac Lawrence, who was Mr. Hochrein's cousin. (Trial Tr., p.225,
L.20 - p.226, L.10.) On the day of the charged offense, Mr. Lawrence testified that he
and Mr. Hochrein were at the house of another one of Mr. Hochrein's cousins, Cynthia
Ellenwood 2 , to work on a car there. (Trial Tr., p.226, Ls.11-17.) Mr. Lawrence dropped
Mr. Hochrein off at the house because Mr. Hochrein did not have a functioning car at
the time.

Mr. Lawrence testified that he stayed at

(Trial Tr., p.227, Ls.10-16.)

Ms. Ellenwood's home with Mr. Hochrein until 7 p.m. that evening - well after the time
that Mr. Hochrein was alleged to have violated the no-contact order in this case. (Trial
Tr., p.227, Ls.21-24.)

According to Mr. Lawrence's testimony, he never saw

Mr. Hochrein leave the residence at all that day. (Trial Tr., p.228, Ls.8-22.)
Another of Mr. Hochrein's cousins, Cynthia Ellenwood, also testified for
Mr. Hochrein at trial.

(Trial Tr., p.235, Ls.19-21, p.241, Ls.17-19.) She testified that

Mr. Hochrein was at her house the entire day of the charged offense because he was
helping to fix their family vehicle so that Ms. Ellenwood and her long-term domestic
partner could go to a banquet for their daughter. (Trial Tr., p.236, Ls.17-24.) According
to her testimony, Mr. Hochrein was at their home the entire day and never went
anywhere alone during that time. (Trial Tr., p.237, Ls.10-23.)
Ms. Ellenwood's domestic partner, Robert Fernandez, provided similar testimony
at trial as to Mr. Hochrein's whereabouts for the entire day of the alleged offense. (Trial

Although Mr. Lawrence originally referred to Ms. Ellenwood in his testimony as "Cindy
Fernandez," he subsequently clarified that he was talking about Ms. Ellenwood. (Trial
Tr., p.227, Ls.17-18.)
2
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Tr., p.251, Ls.2-3.)

Mr. Fernandez was acquainted with Mr. Hochrein, but was not

related to him and was not a close personal friend. (Trial Tr., p.251, L.18 - p.252, L.1.)
He testified that he and Mr. Hochrein were working together all day on the date of the
alleged contact in order to try to repair Mr. Fernandez's car. (Trial Tr.,252, Ls.2-19.) In
fact, Mr. Fernandez testified that Mr. Hochrein had actually spent the night that evening
because they did not complete the repairs on the car, so he wanted to continue working
on it the following morning. (Trial Tr., p.256, Ls.10-21, p.262, Ls.1-4.) Mr. Hochrein
rested his case following Mr. Fernandez's testimony. (Trial Tr., p.271, Ls.7-13.)
Following the presentation of evidence, the district court provided the jury with
instructions. Among these instructions was a non-pattern elements instruction for the
offense of violation of a no-contact order and an instruction providing what purported to
be the substance of I.C. § 18-920. (Trial Tr., p.281, L.5 - p.282, L.3; R., p.151-152.)
However, both the elements instruction provided to the jury and the statement of the
substance of I.C. § 18-920 omitted the essential element from this offense that the
defendant must have had prior notice of the no-contact order. (Trial Tr., p.281, L.5 p.282, L.3; R., pp.151-152.) The State further emphasized in closing argument that its
entire evidentiary burden was contained within the district court's elements instruction.
(Trial Tr., p.289, Ls.20-24.)
The jury convicted Mr. Hochrein of felony violation of a no-contact order, and
additionally found him to be a persistent violator. (Trial Tr., p.334, Ls.18-25, p.345, L.23
- p.346, L.16, p.356, L.8 - p.357, L.16; R., pp.129-133.) The district court sentenced
Mr. Hochrein to ten years, with three years fixed, for his conviction for felony violation of
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a no contact order, with a persistent violator sentencing enhancement,3

(11/4/10

Tr., p.32, Ls.7-13; R., pp.180-182.) Mr. Hochrein timely appeals from his judgment of
conviction and sentence. (R., p.186.)

The district court also revoked Mr. Hochrein's misdemeanor probation and ordered his
underlying misdemeanor sentences into execution. (11/4/10 Tr., p.33, Ls.14-21.)

3

9

ISSUES
1.

Was there insufficient evidence to support the State's charge of felony violation
of a no-contact order under I.C. § 18-920?

2.

Were the district court's jury instructions defining the elements of the offense of
violation of a no-contact order fatally deficient because these instructions omitted
the essential element requiring the State to prove that Mr. Hochrein had prior
notice of the no-contact order he was alleged to have violated?

3.

Did the district court err when it granted the State's motion in limine to preclude
Mr. Hochrein from impeaching Ms. Lewis with evidence of her prior conviction for
felony possession of a financial transaction card?
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ARGUMENT
I.
There Was Insufficient Evidence To Support The State's Charge Of Felony Violation Of
A No-Contact Order Under I.C. § 18-920
A.

Introduction
The State in this case never presented any evidence to the jury at all to indicate

that Mr. Hochrein had any prior notice of the no-contact order underpinning the State's
allegations in this case. Because this is an essential element of the offense of felony
violation of a criminal no-contact order under I.C. § 18-920, and because no evidence at
all was presented to the jury as to this element, Mr. Hochrein submits that the State's
evidence was insufficient to support Mr. Hochrein's conviction.

B.

Standard Of Review
The standard of review upon a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to

support a conviction is whether the jury's verdict is supported by substantial, competent
evidence. See, e.g., State v. Vandenacre, 131 Idaho 507, 510 (Ct. App. 1998). This
Court will not overturn a conviction based upon insufficiency of the evidence where a
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt, nor will this Court substitute its own view of the evidence for that of
the jury. Id. All evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the State. Id. Further,
matters regarding credibility of the witnesses, the weight of the testimony, and the
reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom are solely within the province of the jury.
Id. "A judgment must be reversed, however, if the evidence is insufficient to support the

conviction."

State v. Hughes, 130 Idaho 698,701, 946 P.2d 1338, 1341 (Ct. App.

1997).
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Where, as here, a defendant elects to introduce evidence rather than to rely
solely on a I.C.R. 29 motion for a judgment of acquittal, the defendant waives the right
to limit this Court's review on appeal to the sufficiency of the evidence at the close of the
State's evidence.

Id.

Rather, this Court reviews all of the evidence, including that

offered by the defense, in determining whether there was sufficient evidence to sustain
the conviction. Id.

C.

There Was Insufficient Evidence To Support The State's Charge Of Felony
Violation Of No Contact Order Under I.C. § 18-920

1.

Prior Notice Of The Criminal No-Contact Order Is An Essential Element Of
The Offense Of Felony Violation Of A No-Contact Order Under I.C. § 18920

Mr. Hochrein was charged with felony violation of a criminal no-contact order
pursuant to I.C. § 18-910.

(R., pp.101-102.)

Under this provision, a violation of a

criminal no-contact order can be punished as a separate criminal offense when the
person charged: (1) has previously been charged or conviction for an offense for which
a criminal no-contact order may issue; (2) a criminal no-contact order has been issued
for that offense; and (3) the person charged has had contact with the party covered by
the no-contact order in violation of the provisions of the no-contact order. See I. C. § 18920 (2). In addition, no person may be arrested for the offense of violation of a nocontact order without a warrant unless there is probable cause to believe both that the
person has violated the no-contact order and that the person had prior notice of the
order. I.C. § 18-920(4).
There appear to be no cases in Idaho delineating the essential elements of the
offense of violating a no-contact order, and none dealing with the specific issue of the
requisite mental state or scienter for a conviction of this offense. Mr. Hochrein submits
12

that, in light of persuasive precedent and the language of the statute itself, the State
must prove that the defendant had knowledge of the existence of the no-contact order
at the time of the alleged contact - i.e. prior notice of the order - in order to establish
criminal liability for a violation of such an order.
First and foremost, due process requires that the charged individual have prior
notice of the no-contact order before criminal liability can be imposed on the basis of an
alleged violation of that order's terms. "It is well established that a conviction under a
criminal enactment which does not give adequate notice that the conduct charged is
prohibited is violative of due process." Wright v. Georgia, 373 U.S. 284, 293 (1963). In
fact, even when the regulation at issue is a prison rule, as opposed to a criminal statute,
due process requires fair notice that the conduct at issue is prohibited before a sanction
can be imposed. See, e.g., Nelson v. Hayden, 138 Idaho 619,622 (Ct. App. 2003).
Regarding penal laws of general applicability, satisfying the notice requirement
demanded by due process is fairly straightforward - the statute itself that defines a
criminal offense is generally deemed to put the public on notice as to what conduct may
or may not subject them to criminal punishment. See, e.g., Wilson v. State, 133 Idaho
874, 880 (Ct. App. 2000).

As was noted by the Wilson Court, "it is axiomatic that

citizens are presumptively charged with knowledge of the law once such laws are
passed." Id.
But no-contact orders that are entered solely against a particular individual are
different. Unlike criminal statutes, which define criminal offenses generally and apply to
all those subject to the laws of Idaho, criminal no-contact orders are issued solely
against one individual and are frequently directed at contacts that would be entirely
legal in absence of the individualized order. See I.C. § 18-920.
13

For example, if another person engaged in the alleged conduct in this case - i.e.
knocking on Ms. Lewis' front door - in absence of a court order prohibiting this conduct,
no offense at all would be committed. Likewise, if Mr. Hochrein was alleged to have
knocked on someone else's door that had no relationship with Ms. Lewis, he would not
have committed any offense.

The only thing that rendered the alleged conduct of

Mr. Hochrein criminal was the existence of a specific court order prohibiting the contact.
In light of this, because it is solely the no-contact order that gives rise to any criminal
liability for the alleged actions, due process requires that the person charged with its
violation be proven to have notice of this order before criminal liability can be imposed.
The distinction between criminal liability arising out of a statute of general
applicability and that arising solely out of a court order applying solely to one particular
individual has been noted by the Court of Appeals of Texas in interpreting their own
version of the offense of violation of a protective order. See Small v. State, 809 S.W.2d
253 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). In Small, the defendant asserted that prior knowledge of
the restraining order at issue was an essential element of the offense of violation of that
protective order, and the Small court agreed. 4 Id. at 255-257. In doing so, the Small
court elaborated on the distinction between criminal liability emerging from a court order
specific to only one person, and criminal liability arising from statutes of general
applicability:
Although the law is clear that a defendant is presumed to know statutory
law, the State cannot convincingly argue that a defendant is presumed to
know what every court order ever issued prohibits. The State did not
satisfy its obligation, as alleged, by simply establishing that the appellant
knowingly and intentionally went near and to the household prohibited by
the order, with or without knowledge of the existence of the order in
This Court may wish to note that the statute at issue in Small expressly required that
the violation of the protective order be knowing or intentional in order to sustain a
conviction. See Small, 809 S.W.2d at 253-257.
4
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question. For the appellant to have knowingly and intentionally violated
the order, it was necessary for the appellate to have been aware of the
order, and since the burden is on the State to establish its charge, the
State was required to furnish this evidence.

Small, 809 S.W.2d at 256.
This is consistent, both with the provisions of I.C. § 18-920 and with the model
pattern instructions crafted by the Idaho Supreme Court with regard to the elements of
the offense of violation of a no-contact order. While subsection (2) of I. C. § 18-920
does not spell out that prior knowledge or notice of the existence of the no-contact order
is required, a different section makes abundantly clear that no person may be arrested
without a warrant without probable cause to believe that this individual had notice of the
order. See I. C. § 18-920(4). This is an implicit acknowledgement that prior notice of the
order criminalizing the charged conduct is essential in order to curtail the defendant's
liberty for such a suspected violation.
Also likely in acknowledgement of the due process requirement of prior notice,
the Idaho Supreme Court crafted the model jury instruction for the elements of violating
a no-contact order to expressly require prior notice of the order as an element. The
model pattern elements instruction for this offense provides that:
In order to find the defendant to be guilty of Violating a No Contact Order,
the state must prove each of the following:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

On or about [date]
in the State of Idaho
the defendant [name]
had been [charged with] [or] [convicted of] [ ], and
a no contact order had been issued by a court or by an Idaho
criminal rule forbidding the defendant from having contact with
[name of person], and
6. the defendant had contact with [name of person] in violation of
the order, and
7. before such contact the defendant had notice of the order.
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If any of the above has not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, you
must find the defendant not guilty. If each of the above has been proven
beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the defendant guilty.
I.C.J.1. 1282 (emphasis added).
The fact that the model pattern instructions for the elements of this offense
includes the requirement that the State prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the
defendant had prior notice of the no-contact order, while not itself a binding statement of
law, is important persuasive precedent that due process requires such notice.
Finding that prior notice of the no-contact order is an essential element is further
consistent with the legal requirement in Idaho that there be a union of act and intent in
order to sustain a criminal conviction.

See I.C. § 18-114.

Unlike other statutes that

have been found to not have any knowledge or scienter requirement, this statute is not

a public welfare offense5 , but was intended specifically to deter intentional and
personally culpable conduct.

The Statement of Purpose provided by the Idaho

legislature in first adopting this provision indicates that the intent of this provision was to
protect those who may be the victims of crime from being contacted by the alleged
perpetrator when the victim is covered by a no-contact order and to allow for
warrantless arrests where there is probable cause to believe that this has occurred.
See S.L. 1997, ch. 314, § 1. Subsequent changes to this statute have further expanded

this law to address the personal culpability of those who engage in repeated efforts at
violating no-contact orders issued by the court. See S.L. 2008, ch. 259, § 1.
Because a violation of I. C. § 18-920 is the type of offense directed at personal
culpability, it is therefore subject to the requirement of a union of act and intent as
contained in I.C. § 18-114. Moreover, the action for which the defendant must have a

5

See, e.g., State v. Taylor, 139 Idaho 402,404-405 (Ct. App. 2003).
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demonstrable intent is not merely contact under I.C. § 18-920, but is rather contact that
is directed at the person covered by the no-contact order and that is in violation of the
order itself. See I.C. § 18-920(2)(c). In order to intend to have contact in violation of
the order, the defendant must, as a logical corollary, first be shown to have knowledge
that the order exists. Accordingly, the operation of I.C. § 18-114 is further evidence that
the State is required to prove that a defendant had prior knowledge of the no-contact
order as an essential element of a charge of violation of a no-contact order under
I.C. § 18-920.
Likewise, this is consistent with case law in Idaho recognizing that knowledge of
the court's order is a necessary component for the imposition of criminal contempt
sanctions, which is essentially what criminal punishment for the violation of a no-contact
order is. Criminal contempt may occur, inter alia, when an individual engages in willful
disobedience of an order that was lawfully issued by the court. See I.C. § 18-1801(4).
Criminal contempt proceedings which may result in the imposition of significant
incarceration carry with them the full panoply of due process protections as any other
criminal offense.

See, e.g., International Union, United Mine Workers of America v.

Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 826-827 (1994); Camp v. East Fork Ditch Co., Ltd., 137 Idaho

850, 860-861 (2002).

This includes the requirement that all of the elements of the

contempt be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Steiner v. Gilbert, 144 Idaho 240, 246
(2007).
In interpreting the requirements for imposing criminal sanctions for contempt, the
Idaho Supreme Court has recently held that the act of disobeying the court's order must
be shown to be willful in character.

State v. Rice, 145 Idaho 554, 556 (2008).

Moreover, to impose such liability for violating a court's order, "the order must be clear
17

and unequivocal." Id. Finally, because what is being punished is "disobedience" of the
court's order, this very concept requires first that the individual be aware of what is
being commanded by the court before he or she could have been found to have willfully
acted contrary - or in disobedience to - that order. And this requires that the person be
shown to have had notice of the court's directive prior to the offending action. Because
Mr. Hochrein's charged offense under I.C. § 18-920 is a species of, or at least highly
analogous to, other criminal contempt proceedings, he asserts that this Court should
recognize prior notice of the no-contact order as an essential element of the charged
offense in his case.
Additionally, this interpretation is consistent with prior case law from the Idaho
Supreme Court dealing with the criminalization of conduct that would otherwise be
permissible but for the fact that this conduct was in violation of a lawful order from one
charged with enforcing the law. In such cases, the Idaho Supreme Court has already
recognized the necessity of implying a knowledge requirement of the actual order given
prior to imposing criminal punishment for violating that order. See State v. Winter, 24
Idaho 749,135 P. 739, 740-741 (1913).
At issue in Winter was the defendant's conviction for unlawfully resisting an
officer who was engaged in the discharge of an official duty. Winter, 135 P. at 739. The
Winter Court recognized almost a full century ago that it was necessary to read in a

requirement both that a defendant had knowledge that the person he was dealing with
was an officer and also knowledge that the officer was acting in the course of his or her
official duties in order to secure a conviction. State v. Winter, 24 Idaho 749, 135 P. 739,
740 (1913). The Court in Winter specifically noted that the statute itself only provided
that a defendant had to resist, delay, or obstruct willfully.
18

Id. However, the Court

determined that, given the nature of what the State was attempting to criminalize, the
defendant also had to possess an additional mental state for the requisite union of act
and intent to be present. The Winter Court first observed that the statute itself, "in no
way deals with intent; it only deals with acts." Id. The Court went on to determine:
It is necessary, we think, in a case of this kind, for the state to show that
the person who was resisted was at the time an officer, and that the
defendant knew such fact, and that the defendant also knew at the time he
offered resistance that the officer was attempting to seNe process or
perform some official act, or was engaged in or was in pursuit of some
official duty.
Id.

This requirement that the State prove two separate aspects of the defendant's
knowledge - knowledge that the person was an officer and knowledge that, at the time
of the resistance, the officer was attempting to perform some official act or duty - have
been maintained through present case law in Idaho, despite the fact that the statute
itself does not expressly require anything regarding the defendant's particular mental
state. See, e.g., State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804,816 (2009); State v. Adams, 138 Idaho
624,629 (Ct. App. 2003); State v. Wilkerson, 114 Idaho 174, 178-179 (Ct. App. 1988).
Likewise, in order for the conduct at issue in this case to have been unlawful, it
was only through the operation of an order directed specifically at Mr. Hochrein from the
trial court, and not from a statute of general operation that would have otherwise
provided him constitutionally required notice. As such, this Court should likewise imply
a requirement that the State prove Mr. Hochrein had actual knowledge of this order in
order to sustain a conviction under I.C. § 18-920.
Finally, to the extent to which this Court may believe that I.C. § 18-920 is
ambiguous with regard to whether prior notice of the no-contact order is an essential
element of the charged offense, the rule of lenity mandates that this ambiguity be
resolved in Mr. Hochrein's favor. When the statute in question is a criminal statute, the
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statute must be strictly construed by the courts with regard to both the elements of the
crime and the potential penalty involved; and the rule of lenity applies. See State v.
Thompson, 101 Idaho 430, 437 (1980). "The rule of lenity states that criminal statutes

must be strictly construed in favor of defendants." Id. (quoting State v. Barnes, 124
Idaho 379, 380 (1993)).

Therefore, should any residual doubt remain as to whether

prior notice is a required element under the statutory formulation of this offense,
Mr. Hochrein submits that the rule of lenity dictates that this Court resolve that doubt in
his favor.

2.

Because The State Presented No Evidence At All That Mr. Hochrein Had
Prior Knowledge Of The Criminal No-Contact Order At Issue In The
State's Allegations, The State's Evidence Was Insufficient As A Matter Of
Law To Support Mr. Hochrein's Conviction

In this case, the State presented absolutely no evidence at trial that Mr. Hochrein
had prior notice of the criminal no-contact order that he was alleged to have violated.
Because this is an essential element of the offense of felony violation of a no-contact
order under I.C. § 18-920, his conviction for this offense must be reversed with
prejudice.
The State did, at the preliminary hearing in Mr. Hochrein's case, admit
evidence of two criminal no-contact orders, one of which was signed by Mr. Hochrein.
(Consolidated Exhibits 6 , pp.2, 6-8 (Preliminary Hearing Exhibits 4 & 5)) However, for
unknown reasons, the State did not present either order, including the one that

6 The exhibits from both Mr. Hochrein's preliminary hearing and his trial were submitted
as part of the record in this case in electronic format from the district court, and each
document was numbered consecutively within this format. For ease of reference,
Mr. Hochrein refers herein to these exhibits both in accordance with the number of the
exhibit and proceeding at which it was offered, as well as the page number for the
exhibit within the electronic format.
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Mr. Hochrein had signed, to the jury as part of the evidence that the jury could consider
in this case. (See Trial Tr., generally; Consolidated Exhibits, p.2.) There was likewise
no testimony at trial from any of the witnesses - neither those testifying for the State nor
those testifying on Mr. Hochrein's behalf - that would provide any evidence that he had
the required notice. (See Trial Tr., generally.) Therefore the jury never had before it
any evidence that Mr. Hochrein actually had prior notice of the no-contact order that he
was alleged to have violated.
This evidentiary gap was not filled by the stipulation entered into by the parties in
this case.

As part of the trial proceedings, the parties entered into the following

stipu lation:
On January 28, 2010, a No Contact Order issued by a Court was in effect
in Case No. CR2009-0002146. The No Contact Order was issued
because the Defendant, Edward R. Hochrein, Jr., had been charged with
or convicted of an offense for which the Court found that a No Contact
Order was appropriate. The No Contact Order prohibited the Defendant
from contacting Tanya Lewis. The No Contact Order also prohibited the
Defendant from being at Mr. Lewis' residence.
Consolidated Exhibits, p.12 (State's Trial Exhibit 3a).
Noticeably absent from this stipulation is anything that provides for, or would
allow a reasonable inference that, Mr. Hochrein had received prior notice of the nocontact order that he was criminally charged with violating.

As such, even the

stipulation entered into by the parties in this case could not have provided an
evidentiary basis for a reasonable juror to find that Mr. Hochrein had knowledge or prior
notice of the criminal no-contact order he was alleged to have violated. Because this is
an essential element of the charged offense, there was therefore insufficient evidence to
support his conviction for felony violation of a no-contact order.
II.
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The District Court's JUry Instructions Defining The Elements Of The Offense Of
Violation Of A No-Contact Order Were Fatally Deficient Because These Instructions
Omitted The Essential Element Requiring The State To Prove That Mr. Hochrein Had
Prior Notice Of The No-Contact Order He Was Alleged To Have Violated

A.

Introduction
The jury in this case was never instructed that, in order to convict Mr. Hochrein of

the charged offense, they were required to find beyond a reasonable doubt that
Mr. Hochrein had prior notice of the no-contact order.

The district court's elements

instruction therefore omitted an essential element of the charged offense. And this error
was not harmless. Not only was there not overwhelming and uncontroverted evidence
of this element, there was no evidence presented at trial to sustain a finding as to this
element. Accordingly, the State cannot meet its burden in this case to establish that the
instructional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

B.

Standard Of Review
The question of whether the jury was properly instructed is a question of law that

this Court reviews de novo. State v. Pearce, 146 Idaho 241,247 (2008); State v. Rolon,
146 Idaho 684, 693 (Ct. App. 2008). This Court reviews the jury instructions as a whole
in order to determine whether the instructions fully and accurately reflect applicable law.
Rolon, 146 Idaho at 693.
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C.

The District Court's Jury Instructions Defining The Elements Of The Offense Of
Violation Of A No-Contact Order Were Fatallv Deficient Because These
Instructions Omitted The Essential Element Requiring The State To Prove That
Mr. Hochrein Had Prior Notice Of The No-Contact Order He Was Alleged To
Have Violated

1.

Clarification Of The Standard Of Review On Appeal For The Omission Of
An Essential Element In The Jury Instructions For The Elements Of The
Charged Offense

In this case, it is impossible to know whether Mr. Hochrein objected to the
elements instruction that was provided to the jury regarding the required findings in
order to convict Mr. Hochrein of violating a no-contact order. This is because the district
court unilaterally pulled the jury instructions conference off the record during
Mr. Hochrein's trial.? (Trial Tr., p.222, Ls.2-7.) However, in light of the Idaho Supreme
Court's recent holding in State v. Draper, whether Mr. Hochrein objected at trial to the
omission of an essential element from the to-convict instruction appears to be
immaterial to this Court's standard of review. See State v. Draper, 151 Idaho 576, 587592 (2011).

? This Court may wish to note that there is some indication that Mr. Hochrein objected to
at least one of the jury instructions during this conference which the district court pulled
off of the record. In the initial notice of appeal filed in this case by trial counsel, counsel
notes as a potential preliminary issue on appeal the question of whether, "the court
erred in its instructions to the jury." (R., p.187.) If defense counsel had no objection to
any of the instructions provided to the jury, it would be unlikely that counsel would
identify these instructions as a basis for an assertion of error on appeal. Additionally,
this Court may wish to note that appellate counsel attempted to obtain a transcript of the
jury instruction conference for purposes of appeal through a motion to augment and
suspend that was initially granted by the Idaho Supreme Court. (See Motion to
Augment and Suspend, filed on September 7, 2011; Order Granting Motion to Augment
and Suspend, entered on September 28, 2011.) However, the order granting the
motion to augment and suspend was subsequently withdrawn when the Court was
informed by the court reporter that no record of this proceeding existed from which a
transcript could be provided. (See Order Withdrawing Order Granting Motion to
Augment and Suspend the Briefing Schedule, entered on October 24, 2011.)
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In Draper, it was abundantly clear that the defendant's challenges to the jury
instructions in that case were raised for the first time on appeal. Id. at 587-588. Among
the challenges raised was an assertion that the elements instruction provided to the jury
for the charge of conspiracy to commit murder omitted an essential element of the
charged offense. Id. at 589-592. Despite the State's argument that a different standard
applied to this claim on appeal, the Draper Court held that, not only did such claims
always rise to the level of a fundamental error, but that the same standard of review for
these claims would apply regardless of whether there was an objection at trial.
First, regarding the fact that such an assertion inherently raised a claim of a
fundamental error, the Draper Court held:
Draper's argument is that the jury instructions relieved the State of its duty
to prove all elements of the charges beyond a reasonable doubt. If these
arguments are correct, Draper has been denied his right to due process
and those errors would rise to the level of a fundamental error. "The
United States Supreme Court has held that in criminal trials, 'the State
must prove every element of the offense, and a jury instruction violates
due process if it fails to give effect to this requirement.'" Here, if the
instruction omitted a contested element of the crime, it would have
violated Draper's due process rights and would consequently rise to the
level of a fundamental error.
Id. at 588 (internal citation omitted).

The Draper Court did not engage in the three-part test for non-objected to trial
error that is set forth in part of the Idaho Supreme Court Opinion in State v. Perry, which
defines the standard of review for various types of errors on appeal, despite the fact that
there was no objection at trial to the instructional error. 8 See Draper, 151 Idaho at 589-

The Draper Court's treatment of jury instruction error is entirely consistent with its prior
Opinion in Perry, which likewise analyzed instructional error separately than other trial
errors within its discussion of the standards of appellate review, and did not distinguish
between objected-to and non-objected-to jury instruction errors with regard to the
appropriate standard of appellate review. See Perry, 150 Idaho at 223-224.
8
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592; State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 223-224; 226 (2010).

Instead, the Draper Court

applied the singular standard articulated in Perry for all jury instruction errors. Id. at
591.

And this standard, in turn, is taken from the U.S. Supreme Court Opinion in

Nederv. U.S., 527 U.S. 1 (1999). Id.; see also Perry, 150 Idaho at 223-224.
Neder, Draper, and Perry all hold that the test for whether the omission of an

essential element from the jury instructions is harmless is whether a reviewing court can
conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the omitted element was supported by
overwhelming and uncontroverted evidence, such that the jury verdict would be the
same absent the error. Nederv. U.S., 527 U.S. 1, 17 (1999); Draper, 151 Idaho at 591;
Perry, 150 Idaho at 224. Put another way, where a rational jury could have found that

the State failed to prove the omitted element, the instructional error cannot be harmless
and the reviewing court shall vacate the conviction. Neder, 527 U.S. at 19; Perry, 150
Idaho at 228.

2.

The District Court's JUry Instructions Defining The Elements Of The
Offense Of Violation Of A No-Contact Order Were Fatallv Deficient
Because These Instructions Omitted The Essential Element Requiring The
State To Prove That Mr. Hochrein Had Prior Notice Of The No-Contact
Order He Was Alleged To Have Violated

As was previously noted in this case, that the defendant had prior notice of the
no-contact order is an essential element for a conviction for a violation of that order
under I.C. § 18-920.

See Point I(C)(1), supra.

Additionally, the model pattern

instructions for the elements of the charge of violation of a no-contact order expressly
require that the state prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that before the conduct
alleged, "the defendant had notice of the order."

I.C.J.1. 1282.

'The pattern Idaho

Criminal Jury Instructions are presumptively correct." State v. Hopper, 142 Idaho 512,
514 (Ct. App. 2005).
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However, the district court did not provide the pattern elements instruction for the
charge of violation of a no-contact order.

Instead, the district court provided its own

instruction, and this instruction failed to include the essential element that the defendant
had prior notice of the no-contact order the he or she is charged with violating. (Trial
Tr., p.281, L.5 - p.282 L.3; R, pp.151-152.) Because the district court's instructions
failed to require the jury to find all of the elements necessary to the charged offense,
this error deprived Mr. Hochrein of his right to due process. Draper, 151 Idaho at 588.
Moreover, it cannot be said, beyond a reasonable doubt that this error was
harmless. As has been noted, the State presented no evidence at all that Mr. Hochrein
had any prior notice of the no-contact order that formed the basis for the State's
allegation in this case. Accordingly, there was no evidence, much less overwhelming
evidence, to support this element. In light of this, any rational juror could have found in
Mr. Hochrein's favor regarding this element. See Neder, 527 U.S. at 17; Draper, 151
Idaho at 591; Perry, 150 Idaho at 224.

III.
The District Court Erred When It Granted The State's Motion In Limine To Preclude
Mr. Hochrein From Impeaching Ms. Lewis With Evidence Of Her Prior Conviction For
Felony Possession Of A Financial Transaction Card Because Ms. Lewis' Withheld
Judgment For This Offense Is A Prior Conviction For Purposes Of !.RE. 609

A.

Introduction
The district court in this case initially and correctly determined that Ms. Lewis'

prior conviction for possession of a financial transaction card was relevant to the issue
of her credibility pursuant to I.RE. 609.

However, the district court erroneously

determined that, because Ms. Lewis was still on probation having been provisionally
granted a withheld judgment for this offense, it did not constitute a conviction for
26

purposes of this evidentiary rule. Because the district court's ruling was in conflict with
the recent Idaho Supreme Court Opinion in U.S.

V.

Sharp 9, and because this conviction

had direct relevance to Ms. Lewis' credibility, the district court erred when it granted the
State's motion in limine seeking to preclude Mr. Hochrein from impeaching Ms. Lewis
with this conviction.

B.

Standard Of Review
"The district court has broad discretion in the admission and exclusion of

evidence, and its decision to admit evidence will be reversed only where there has been
a clear showing of an abuse of that discretion." State v. Perry, 139 Idaho 520, 521
(2003). This Court applies a three-part test with regard to the question of whether the
district court abused its discretion. First, this Court examines whether the district court
correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion.

Id.

Second, this Court reviews

whether the district court acted within the proper bounds of its discretion and
consistently with the legal standards that are attendant on its determination. Id. Finally,
this Court must determine whether the district court reached its discretionary
determination through an exercise of reason. Where the defendant objects to the error
at issue on appeal, the State bears the burden of establishing that the error was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209,228 (2010).

9

U.S. v. Sharp, 145 Idaho 403 (2008).
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C.

The District Court Erred When It Granted The State's Motion In Limine To
Preclude Mr. Hochrein From Impeaching Ms. Lewis With Evidence Of Her Prior
Conviction For Felony Possession Of A Financial Transaction Card Because
Ms. Lewis' Withheld Judgment For This Offense Is A Prior Conviction For
Purposes Of I.R.E. 609

1.

Ms. Lewis' Withheld Judgment For Felony Possession Of A Financial
Transaction Card Constitutes A Conviction For Purposes Of I.R.E. 609

The district court in this case erroneously determined that Ms. Lewis' conviction
for felony possession of a financial transaction card was not a "conviction" for purposes
of I.R.E. 609. Mr. Hochrein asserts that this determination was legal error in light of the
Idaho Supreme Court Opinion in U.S. v. Sharp, 145 Idaho 403 (2008).
Idaho Rule of Evidence 609 provides for the general rule that evidence of a prior
felony conviction can be admissible in order to attack the credibility of a witness. See
I.R.E. 609 (a).

However, !.R.E. 609(c) contains a caveat against the use of certain

convictions for purposes of this general rule. Idaho Rule of Evidence 609(c) provides
that:

(c) Withheld judgment or vacated judgment; pardon for innocence.
Evidence of a withheld judgment or vacated judgment shall not be
admitted as a conviction. Nor shall a conviction that has been the subject
of a pardon, annulment or other equivalent procedure based on a finding
of innocence be admissible under this rule.
I.R.E. 609 (c).
There appear to be no cases in Idaho directly addressing the question of whether
the term "withheld judgment" in this provision means the initial withholding of judgment
and placing of a defendant on probation under I.C. § 19-2601 (3) and (5); or whether it
instead means the ultimate granting of relief pursuant to I.C. § 19-2604, permitting the
defendant to set aside his or her guilty plea, terminating the case, and dismissing the
judgment. Mr. Hochrein submits that, in light of pertinent case law - particularly the
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Sharp Opinion - and relevant principles of statutory construction, the clear intent of this

provision is that a withheld judgment is only excluded as a prior conviction for purposes
of I.R.E. 609 when the actual relief provided for by I.C. § 19-2604 has been forthcoming.
At one point in Idaho, prior to the adoption of the rules of evidence, Idaho case
law had deemed the granting of a withheld judgment to be categorically excluded from
those convictions that may be used to impeach a witness at trial. 1o See State v. Cliett,
96 Idaho 646, 648-650 (1975). The basis for the Cliett Opinion was the notion that,
since a formal judgment had not been entered in those cases where the district court
withheld judgment and placed a defendant on probation, there was not a "conviction" in
such cases. Id.
But the Idaho Supreme Court has recently revisited this issue in the Sharp
Opinion, and expressly overruled the rationale provided in Cliett for finding that a
withheld judgment does not qualify as a felony conviction for impeachment purposes.
Sharp, 145 Idaho at 404-407. This holding was reached in order to answer the question

of whether an outstanding withheld judgment was still a "conviction" where the
defendant had completed his probation, but had not yet moved the district court to set
aside his guilty plea. Sharp, 145 Idaho at 403-404. The Sharp Court held that, where
the withheld judgment is still outstanding because the defendant had not moved to
withdraw his or her plea or set aside the conviction, the verdict or plea of guilty still
constitutes a "conviction" under Idaho law. Id. at 404-407.

At the time of the defendant's conviction in Cliett, the rules governing the admission of
a prior felony conviction for purposes of impeachment were governed by former I.C. § 91209, which was repealed by the Idaho State legislature in 1975. See Cliett, 96 Idaho
at 648; S.L. 1975, Ch. 242, § 1. This provision has since been supplanted by I.R.E.
609.
10
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In light of this, Mr. Hochrein asserts that, for purposes of impeachment under

I.R.E. 609, an outstanding withheld judgment can be used as impeachment unless and
until the witness has actually been granted the relief of withdrawing his or her plea, or
setting aside the underlying conviction, pursuant to I.C. § 19-2604. If the witness has
not yet been granted the relief of withdrawal of the plea or setting aside of the
conviction, the provisions of I.R.E. 609(c) preventing impeachment with this conviction
do not apply.
This interpretation is also consistent with the principle of statutory construction
known as noscitur a sociis, which calls upon a reviewing court to interpret an ambiguous
term in light of the context provided by any surrounding terms.

See, e.g., State v.

Hammersley, 134 Idaho 816, 821 (2000) (overruled on other grounds by State v. Poe,
139 Idaho 885 (2004».

In addition to disqualifying a withheld judgment from being

admitted as evidence of a conviction under I.R.E. 609, subsection (c) of this rule also
precludes presenting evidence of a vacated conviction, a conviction that has been the
subject of a pardon, or a conviction that has been annulled (or any other equivalent
procedure) due to a finding of innocence. See I.R.E. 609(c).
In each of these instances, the salient shared feature is that the underlying
conviction itself is excused or set aside as a matter of law.

Reading the phrase

"withheld judgment" in the context of these other terms, it is clear that what is meant by
"withheld judgment" for purposes of this rule is the actual granting of relief in the form of
setting aside the underlying guilty plea or conviction under I.C. § 19-2604, not merely
the provisional granting of a withheld judgment and placement of the defendant on
probation under I.C. § 19-2601.
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In this case, Ms. Lewis actually entered into a guilty plea to felony possession of
a financial transaction card and had not, at the time of Mr. Hochrein's trial, been granted
the relief of being allowed to withdraw her guilty plea - she was still on felony probation
for this offense at the time of trial. (5/13/10 Tr., p.11, Ls.3-6.) Given this, under the
holding in Sharp, Ms. Lewis still had a conviction for felony possession of a financial
transaction card under Idaho law because she had not yet been granted the relief of
withdrawing her guilty plea. As such, the district court erred when the court determined
that Ms. Lewis did not have a "conviction" for purposes of impeachment under !.R.E.
609. (See 5/20/10 Tr., p.15, L.24 - p.16, L.3.)

2.

Ms. Lewis' Felony Conviction For Possession Of A Financial Transaction
Card Was Relevant To The Issue Of Her Credibility At Trial

Mr. Hochrein additionally asserts that, under the pertinent legal standards
governing this determination, Ms. Lewis' conviction was relevant to her credibility as a
witness, and Mr. Hochrein therefore should have been permitted to impeach Ms. Lewis
with evidence of this conviction at trial.
In order to be admissible as impeachment evidence under !.R.E. 609, a prior
felony conviction must be relevant to the credibility of the witness. See, e.g., State v.
Muraco, 132 Idaho 130, 132 (1998). This Court reviews de novo the issue of whether

the prior conviction is relevant to the witness' credibility. Id.
In State v. Ybarra, the Idaho Supreme Court delineated three main categories of
relevance for purposes of I.R.E. 609.
(1981).

See State v. Ybarra, 102 Idaho 573, 580-581

Some offenses, such as perjury, are intimately connected with the witness'

credibility. Id. at 580. There are intermediate offenses, such as robbery or burglary,
that are somewhat less relevant, but are still probative of issues of credibility.
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Id.

Finally, there exists a third category, generally falling in the class of violent offenses,
that have, "little or no direct bearing on honesty or veracity." Id at 581.
As a general matter, theft offenses such as burglary are admissible in order to
impeach a witness' credibility because these offenses, "do disclose a disregard for the
rights of others which might reasonably be expected to express itself in giving false
testimony whenever it would be to the advantage of the witness." Id.; see also State v.
Christopherson, 108 Idaho 502, 504 (Ct. App. 1985) ("Evidence of a prior felony

conviction for burglary or robbery is relevant to the issue of credibility and may be
admitted for purposes of impeachment.").
However, a review of the statute under which Ms. Lewis was convicted reveals
that her offense is actually a species of fraud under Idaho law, which falls under the
category of an offense that is intimately connected with the witness' credibility - even
more so than general theft.

Ms. Lewis was convicted of criminal possession of a

financial transaction card. (5/13/10 Tr., p.11, Ls.3-4.) Idaho Code § 18-3125 defines
the offense of criminal possession of a financial transaction card. This provision falls
within Chapter 31 of the Idaho Criminal Code, which contains crimes under the
classification of, "False Pretenses, Cheats, and Misrepresentations." See I.C. § 183125 (emphasis added). Moreover, each subsection that provides the means through
which this offense may be committed contains a requirement that the defendant have
the specific intent to defraud in the use of the financial transaction card. Id. At its very
heart, Ms. Lewis' prior conviction for felony possession of a financial transaction card is
a conviction for an offense relating to dishonesty in the acquiring of the property of
another. Therefore, it is clear that this conviction was relevant to issues of Ms. Lewis'
credibility under I.R.E. 609.
32

3.

Because The District Court Failed To Conduct The Required Balancing
Under I.R.E. 403 And 609, And Because This Court Cannot Conduct This
Assessment De Novo, A Remand Is Required In Order For The District
Court To Consider Whether The Probative Value Of Evidence Of
Ms. Lewis' Prior Felony Conviction Outweighs The Unfair Prejudicial Effect
To The State

The district court in this case, after erroneously finding that Ms. Lewis
outstanding withheld judgment was not a conviction for purposes of I.R.E. 609, failed to
conduct the necessary balancing test for admissibility under this rule and I.R.E. 403.
Because this is a fact-driven assessment for which the necessary facts have not yet
been found, and because this Court is not a fact-finding tribunal, Mr. Hochrein submits
that a remand is necessary in order for the district court to make the necessary
determination of whether the probative value of evidence of Ms. Lewis' conviction
outweighs the prejudicial effect to the party offering the witness.
Idaho Rule of Evidence 403 provides, inter alia, that otherwise relevant evidence
may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of
confusion of the issues or misleading the jury. See I.R.E. 403. Similarly, a district court
reviewing the admissibility of a prior conviction under I.R.E. 609 for impeachment
purposes must also determine, "whether the probative value of the evidence outweighs
the prejudicial effect to the party offering the witness." Muraco, 132 Idaho at 227. By
the very terms of these rules, it is a necessary antecedent to the legally required
analysis that the district court first identify and evaluate both the probative value of the
evidence and the potential prejudicial effects prior to being able to weigh that value
against the danger of unfair prejudice, or danger of confusing or misleading the jury.
It is true that this Court can uphold the district court on a correct legal theory,
even when the district court's legal analysis is otherwise in error.
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See, e.g, BECO

Canst. Co., Inc. v. J-U-B Engineers, Inc., 145 Idaho 719, 724 (2008); State v. Baxter,
144 Idaho 672, 679 (Ct. App. 2007). However, it is equally established that this Court,
as an appellate tribunal, does not engage in its own fact finding on review. See, e.g.,
State v. Meister, 148 Idaho 236,241 (2009); Lynch v. Lynch, 106 Idaho 842, 845-846
(1984) (it is an invasion of the province of the trial for an appellate court to readjudicate
controverted facts); Thomas v. Klein, 99 Idaho 105, 109 (1978) (scope of appellate
review is limited, and appellate court will not retry issues of fact or substitute its view of
such issues for the trial court).
The balancing process required under I.RE. 403 and I.RE. 609 is a
fundamentally factual one that requires the trial court to consider a number of factdependant circumstances. See, e.g., U.S. v. Garcia, 567 F.3d 721, 727 (5 th Cir. 2009);
Commonwealth v. Lockcuff, 813 A.2d 857, 861 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002). This is consistent
with the standard of review applied by this Court to admission of I.RE. 609 evidence:
this Court reviews the determination of relevance, an issue of law, de novo; but applies
an abuse of discretion standard to the fact-based process of weighing prejudice versus
probativeness. See e.g. Muraco, 132 Idaho at 227-228.
The Opinion in Meister is instructive on this point.

In Meister, the trial court

erroneously believed that evidence that the defendant sought to introduce regarding an
alternate perpetrator of the charged offense was inadmissible, and also failed to
conduct the necessary balancing test for the admissibility of this evidence under I.R.E.
403 in light of this erroneous belief. Meister, 148 Idaho at 239-241. After noting that the
district court failed to conduct the necessary balancing test to determine the
admissibility of the evidence, the Meister Court did not seek to conduct this balancing
for the first time on appeal. Rather, the Meister Court held that the proper remedy for
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this error was to remand the defendant's case for a new trial so that the district court
could properly weigh the admissibility of this evidence:
By excluding all this evidence from being presented in any context
throughout the course of trial the district court prevented Meister from
presenting potentially relevant facts that may have developed throughout
the course of the trial. Meister should be afforded the opportunity to
present his complete and full defense, which includes the presentation of
all relevant evidence in the context of trial pursuant to any limitations of
the Idaho Rules of Evidence. The district court erred by applying the
wrong standard for admissibility of alternate perpetrator evidence, and
therefore, abused its discretion. Therefore, this Court grants Meister a new
trial.
Meister, 148 Idaho at 241.

Mr. Hochrein respectfully submits that this Court should do the same in his case.
In a case where credibility was a critical issue for the jury, Mr. Hochrein was prevented
from presenting relevant evidence to the jury in aid of his defense at trial. The district
court excluded this impeachment evidence because the court failed to recognize its
admissibility in the first instance, and thereafter the district court failed to engage in the
necessary balancing test in order to properly determine the admissibility of Ms. Lewis'
prior conviction for felony possession of a financial transaction card. As such, this Court
should reverse Mr. Hochrein's conviction and remand this case for further proceedings.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Hochrein respectfully requests that this Court reverse his conviction for felony
violation of a no-contact order with prejudice because the State presented insufficient
evidence to sustain this conviction. In the alternative, Mr. Hochrein asks that this Court
reverse his judgment of conviction and sentence for felony violation of a no-contact
order and remand this case for further proceedings.
DATED this 28 th day of November, 2011.

SARAH E. TOMPKINS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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